


MP-SPDZ at 6

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CSIRO's Data61

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
Imagine a Magic Black Box Between a Set of Parties



Parties

- ▶ Have handles to values
- ▶ Don't know the values
- ▶ Can input values
- ▶ Can agree on computations creating new values
- ▶ Can agree on outputting values

Secure Multiparty Computation: Black Box as Protocol



Wanted: $f(x, y, z)$

- ▶ Computation on secret inputs
- ▶ Replace black box
- ▶ Central questions in MPC
 - ▶ How many honest parties?
 - ▶ Dishonest parties still follow the protocol?
- ▶ MP-SPDZ supports > 40 protocol variants across all properties

MP-SPDZ at CCS'20

- ▶ 30+ protocol variants
- ▶ Live preprocessing
- ▶ Mixed circuits
- ▶ C++ API
- ▶ Python API
- ▶ Dynamic optimization: like HyCC (CCS'18) but all the way
- ▶ Basic machine learning

MP-SPDZ since CCS'20

- ▶ Complex machine learning (e.g., AlexNet training)
- ▶ Decision tree training
- ▶ Secure shuffling
- ▶ Replace KOS with SoftSpokenOT
- ▶ Fantastic Four
- ▶ ATLAS protocol (CRYPTO'21 update on DN07)
- ▶ Dealer protocol (popular in privacy-preserving ML)
- ▶ Distributed key generation for homomorphic encryption
- ▶ Simpler interfaces for machine learning (PyTorch integration)
- ▶ ARM support
- ▶ Bytecode reusability

Compilation with Budget (HyCC)

What to do with loops in MPC?

Consecutive execution slow due to cost of communication rounds

Complete optimization has limits: compilation time, RAM/disk usage

Use a budget!

1. Unroll loop until budget exceeded
2. Optimize unrolled loop
3. Use sequential execution on top of unrolled loop

Example

Need 1000 repetitions: optimize 100, call 10 times

Bytecode Reusability

Mathematical Building Blocks

- ▶ Comparison, exponentiation, logarithm. . .
- ▶ In C/C++: simple call of function or CPU instruction
- ▶ In MPC: want parallelization so no simple function calls

MP-SPDZ


- ▶ Find and combine parallelizable invocations of building blocks
- ▶ Compile functionality once depending on protocol options
- ▶ Reuse bytecode object (faster compilation, lower disk usage)
- ▶ Extra benefit: calling high-level code from C++ (new in version 0.4.0)

Crosstabulation Example

```
for i in range(n):  
    for j in range(n):  
        if x[i] == y[j]:  
            sums[cat[i]] += val[j]
```

- ▶ Example used by Hastings et al. (S&P'19) to evaluate MPC compilers
- ▶ Not necessarily optimal but good test case
 - ▶ Nested loops
 - ▶ Quadratic run-time

Crosstabulation Benchmarks



Time to compile and run cross-tabulation with different MPC frameworks.

* denotes a garbled circuit implementation, and † denotes an emulation.

Secure Shuffling

Have Secret-shared list $[x_1], \dots, [x_n]$

- Want
- ▶ Secret-shared list $[x_{\pi(1)}], \dots, [x_{\pi(n)}]$
 - ▶ π random and secret permutation
 - ▶ Ability to repeat for both π and π^{-1}

Approaches

- ▶ Switching networks (Waksman)
- ▶ Permute by maximally unqualified set (honest majority only)
- ▶ Dual execution for malicious security (akin SPDZ-wise)
- ▶ Recent advances for 2PC using MPC-friendly PRFs (no available implementation)

Application of Secure Shuffling: Sorting

Secret Permutation Operation

Have $[x_1], \dots, [x_n]$ such that $x_1 = \pi(1), \dots, x_n = \pi(n)$
 $[y_1], \dots, [y_n]$

Want $[y_{\pi(1)}], \dots, [y_{\pi(n)}]$ without revealing π

1. Reveal secret shuffle ρ of $[x_1], \dots, [x_n] \Rightarrow$ public description of $\rho \circ \pi$
2. Apply $\rho \circ \pi$ to $[y_1], \dots, [y_n]$
3. Revert secret shuffle ρ on $[y_{(\rho \circ \pi)(1)}], \dots, [y_{(\rho \circ \pi)(n)}]$

Radix Sorting

Build permutation needed to sort bit by bit, then apply to data

Application of Secure Shuffling: Decision Tree Training

Problem

- ▶ Decision trees are trained level by level where samples are sorted into nodes
- ▶ Naive MPC has complexity $O(\#nodes \cdot \#samples)$

Solution by Hamada et al., PETS'22

- ▶ Sort samples by node at every level and use secret node markers
- ▶ Heavily relies on shuffling

From KOS15 to SoftSpokenOT

KOS15

OT extension with malicious security based on IKNP with simple check

Security claim broken by SoftSpokenOT paper

SoftSpokenOT

- ▶ More sophisticated OT extension using codes different to IKNP
- ▶ Parameter determining trade-off between computation and communication
- ▶ Integrated in MP-SPDZ via libOTe

Reception

SoftSpokenOT considered secure *and* more flexible but some keep talking about KOS.
Simplicity?

Outlook

- ▶ MP-SPDZ remains popular (citations/GitHub issues)
- ▶ Unmatched protocol variety
- ▶ Unmatched programmability?